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THE  SUPREME  COURT’S  QUIET  REVOLUTION  IN
INDUCED  PATENT  INFRINGEMENT
Timothy R. Holbrook*
ABSTRACT
The Supreme Court over the last decade or so has reengaged with patent law.  While much
attention has been paid to the Court’s reworking of what constitutes patent-eligible subject matter
and enhancing tools to combat “patent trolls,” what many have missed is the Court’s reworking
of the contours of active inducement of patent infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b).  The
Court has taken the same number of § 271(b) cases as subject matter eligibility cases—four.  Yet
this reworking has not garnered much attention in the literature.  This Article offers the first
comprehensive assessment of the Court’s efforts to define active inducement.  In so doing, it iden-
tifies the surprising significance of the Court’s most recent case, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco
Systems, Inc., where the Court held that a good faith belief on the part of the accused inducer
that the relevant patent is invalid cannot negate the mental state required for inducement—the
intent to induce acts of infringement.  In so doing, the Court moved away from its policy of
encouraging challenges to patent validity as articulated in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins and its prog-
eny.  This step away from Lear is significant and surprising, particularly where critiques of the
patent system suggest there are too many invalid patents creating issues for competition.  This
Article critiques these aspects of Commil and then addresses lingering, unanswered questions.
In particular, this Article suggests that a good faith belief that the induced acts are not infring-
ing, which remains as a defense, should only act as a shield against past damages and not
against prospective relief such as injunctions or ongoing royalties.  The courts so far have failed
to appreciate this important temporal dynamic.
INTRODUCTION
The Supreme Court has taken a considerable, if not somewhat odd,
interest in patent law over the last few years.1  Of all of the Court’s interven-
© 2016 Timothy R. Holbrook.  Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Professor of Law, Emory University School of Law.  My thanks to Jason Rantanen
and Keith Robinson for comments on a draft of this paper.  Mistakes are my own.
1 See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent
Law, 3 IP THEORY 62 (2013).  Since that article was published, the Supreme Court took six
cases its 2013 term, three in its 2014 term, and three cases in its 2015 term. See Cuozzo
Speed Techs., LLC v. Lee, 136 S. Ct. 890 (2016) (granting certiorari); Halo Elecs., Inc. v.
Pulse Elecs., Inc., 136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (granting certiorari); Stryker Corp. v. Zimmer, Inc.,
136 S. Ct. 356 (2015) (granting certiorari).  For a summary of the issues in these cases, see
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tions, its substantial reworking of the law surrounding patentable subject mat-
ter under 35 U.S.C. § 1012 has garnered most attention and commentary.3
Many have missed, however, the quiet revolution the Court has insti-
gated with respect to active inducement of patent infringement under 35
U.S.C. § 271(b).  The provision somewhat tersely states, “Whoever actively
induces infringement of a patent shall be liable as an infringer.”4  Given this
general, unenlightening language, the courts have been left to determine the
contours of this provision, and the Supreme Court has been paying atten-
tion.  Since the October 2004 term, the Supreme Court has decided four
cases interpreting that provision,5 the same number of cases as the Court’s
Supreme Court Patent Cases, WRITTEN DESCRIPTION, http://writtendescription.blogspot.com/
p/patents-scotus.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2016).
2 See, e.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010).
3 See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Applying Patent-Eligible Subject Matter Restrictions, 17 VAND.
J. ENT. & TECH. L. 267 (2015); Tun-Jen Chiang, Competing Visions of Patentable Subject Matter,
82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1858 (2014); Kevin Emerson Collins, The Knowledge/Embodiment
Dichotomy, 47 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1279 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook & Mark D. Janis, Pat-
ent-Eligible Processes: An Audience Perspective, 17 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 349 (2015); Christo-
pher M. Holman, Patent Eligibility Post-Myriad: A Reinvigorated Judicial Wildcard of Uncertain
Effect, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1796 (2014); Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN.
L. REV. 1315 (2011); Jacob S. Sherkow, The Natural Complexity of Patent Eligibility, 99 IOWA L.
REV. 1137 (2014).
4 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012).
5 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015); Limelight Networks,
Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014); Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc., v. SEB
S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S.
913 (2005).  While Grokster is technically a copyright case, the Supreme Court imported
active inducement of infringement from patent law into copyright law. See Grokster, 545
U.S. at 936–37.  The Court said:
For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article doctrine of patent law
as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule, too, is a sensi-
ble one for copyright.  We adopt it here, holding that one who distributes a
device with the object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by
clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable
for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.
Id. (citing Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). Grokster
has been influential in the development of induced infringement in patent law as a result.
See, e.g., Takeda Pharms. U.S.A., Inc. v. West-Ward Pharm. Corp., 785 F.3d 625, 630–31
(Fed. Cir. 2015) (discussing Grokster in interpreting § 271(b)); DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co.,
471 F.3d 1293, 1305–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) (using Grokster to clarify
intent standard under § 271(b)); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The Intent Element of Induced
Infringement, 22 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 399, 400–04, 407–08 (2006)
[hereinafter Holbrook, Intent Element] (discussing Grokster and implications for patent
law).
The Court also addressed 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) in Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S.
437 (2007), which contains a provision regarding the inducement of infringement outside
of the United States. See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Extraterritoriality in U.S. Patent Law,
49 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2119, 2132–36 (2008) (discussing § 271(f) and its extraterritorial
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subject matter eligibility cases.6  In the October 2015 term, the Court issued
its most recent interpretation of § 271(b) in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems,
Inc., holding that an accused infringer’s good faith belief that the relevant
patent is invalid does not negate the requisite intent for inducing
infringement.7
These cases provide important and interesting insights into the Supreme
Court’s views of patent law.  At a minimum, the Court’s active inducement
decisions have favored the patent owner for the most part, which contrasts
sharply with the general anti-patentee trend in the Court’s other patent
cases.8  These four decisions, and particularly Commil, signal significant
changes in the Supreme Court’s views of patent law and policy.  By holding
that a good faith belief that the relevant patent is invalid does not negate the
reach).  Thus, one could say the Supreme Court has actually addressed induced infringe-
ment five times since 2007.
Additionally, the Federal Circuit recently decided Suprema, Inc. v. International Trade
Commission, 796 F.3d 1338, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc), expanding the ability of
patent owners to use inducement theories at the International Trade Commission (ITC).
The en banc court reversed the holding of the panel in the case, which concluded that the
ITC could not exclude articles that, only subsequent to importation, could be arranged to
infringe the patented methods. See Suprema, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 742 F.3d 1350,
1357 (Fed. Cir. 2013), vacated 796 F.3d 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc).  On a 6-5 vote, the
en banc court permitted such claims. Suprema, 796 F.3d at 1340–41.  The split decision by
the en banc court may garner the attention of the Supreme Court, assuming a petition for
a writ of certiorari is filed. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme
Court to the Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 284 (“The extended treatment by the
Federal Circuit signaled to the Supreme Court the importance of the issue and provided a
rich discussion of the competing interests at stake that increased the Justices’ ability to
comprehend and review the case.”); Holbrook, supra note 1, at 69–70 (noting split en banc R
decisions as a factor favoring Supreme Court review).
6 See supra note 5.
7 Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1931.
8 Other pro-patent rulings include Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761, 1766–69
(2013) (finding patent not exhausted, and thus infringed, by replication of patented
seeds), Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011) (holding patent
invalidity must be proven by “clear and convincing evidence”), and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722, 737–41 (2002) (rejecting the Federal Circuit’s
bright-line “complete surrender” rule for prosecution history estoppel, making it easier to
avoid estoppel and prove infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).  Many of the
Court’s decisions, however, have been viewed as weakening the power of patents. See, e.g.,
Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120, 2124, 2128–31 (2014) (making it
easier to prove patent claims are invalid as indefinite); KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007) (rejecting formalistic “teaching-suggestion-motivation to combine” test for
more flexible rule, making it easier to prove patents are invalid as obvious); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391–94 (2006) (eliminating rule for near per se grant
of permanent injunctions in patent cases).  The Supreme Court’s decisions regarding what
subject matter is eligible to be patented have greatly curtailed patent protection for many
innovations. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Bilski v. Kappos. 561 U.S. 593 (2010) (all
invalidating claims as lacking patentable subject matter).
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 4 30-MAR-16 9:11
1010 notre dame law review [vol. 91:3
scienter requirement for active inducement, Commil represents a step away
from the Court’s policy preference of encouraging patent validity challenges
in courts, as previously articulated in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins9 and its progeny.
This Article is the first to provide a comprehensive assessment of this
quiet revolution.  It unpacks these important developments, particularly
highlighting the implications of Commil.  It then explores some unanswered
questions in Commil.  It highlights a glaring oversight not only in the Commil
decision but also with all of the jurisprudence under § 271(b)—the failure of
the courts to recognize that a good faith belief (now only of non-infringe-
ment) should only shelter an accused infringer from past damages; the
infringer should be subject to prospective remedies, such as ongoing royal-
ties and permanent injunctions.  Part I offers an overview of the tetralogy of
cases and their broader impact.  Part II then elaborates how the Court’s deci-
sion in Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.10 advanced the Lear policy
interest by encouraging potential infringers to review patents or else face lia-
bility.  If such a review revealed a belief that the relevant patent was invalid,
the parties would be more likely and willing to enter the market and ulti-
mately challenge the patent. Commil, however, has greatly undermined this
dynamic by eliminating a good faith belief that the patent is invalid as a
defense to active inducement.  Part III then discusses two open questions
after Commil.  First, it evaluates whether Commil eliminates other good faith
defenses from active inducement, concluding that it does.  Second, and more
importantly, Part III argues that the remaining good faith defense—that the
patent is invalid—should only preclude past damages and not prospective
relief.
I. THE INDUCEMENT TETRALOGY—GROKSTER, GLOBAL-TECH,
LIMELIGHT, AND COMMIL
Prior to the adoption of the 1952 Patent Act, case law made clear that
third parties could be held liable for the infringing acts of others through
theories of joint tortfeasance.11  When Congress adopted the 1952 Patent
Act, it codified this common law into two forms of indirect infringement:
active inducement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) and contributory infringement
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(c),12 the latter of which was the “most common” pre-
1952 scenario for such indirect liability—the sale of a component of a paten-
tee invention that is then incorporated into an infringing item.13
9 See Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653 (1969).  Commentators have been critical of
Lear. See, e.g., Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Dethroning Lear: Licensee Estoppel and the Incentive
to Innovate, 72 VA. L. REV. 677, 683 (1986) (summarizing critique).
10 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
11 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1468–69 (Fed. Cir.
1990) (“Prior to the enactment of the Patent Act of 1952, there was no statute which
defined what constituted infringement.”).
12 Id. at 1469.
13 Id.
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Although Congress included within § 271(c) considerable details as to
its requirements,14 § 271(b) remains a vague, catch-all provision, the con-
tours of which were left to the courts to determine.15  Notwithstanding this
apparent delegation to the courts, the Supreme Court remained silent with
respect to active inducement until the mid-2000s.  While the Court did
address § 271(c) in 1964 in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible Top Replace-
ment Co.,16 it took the Court over fifty years17 to address § 271(b).  Somewhat
surprisingly, when it decided to do so, it was in a copyright case.
A. Induced Infringement and Illegal Downloads of Copyrighted Works in
MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
The Supreme Court’s first substantive discussion of § 271(b) arose in the
context of illegal digital downloads of copyrighted music.  The accused copy-
right infringers, Grokster and StreamCast, ran a peer-to-peer file sharing sys-
tems whose primary uses were to exchange copyrighted music among users
without permission from the copyright holders.18  Prior to the decision, most
observers believed that the Court would elaborate on its decision in Sony
Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc. and explain its application in the
online context.19  In Sony, the Supreme Court incorporated patent law’s con-
tributory infringement doctrine under § 271(c) into copyright law.20  That
provision creates a safe harbor from liability if the component sold or
imported has a substantial use that does not result in infringement of the
14 Section 271(c) defines contributory infringement as:
Whoever offers to sell or sells within the United States or imports into the United
States a component of a patented machine, manufacture, combination or compo-
sition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, consti-
tuting a material part of the invention, knowing the same to be especially made or
especially adapted for use in an infringement of such patent, and not a staple
article or commodity of commerce suitable for substantial noninfringing use,
shall be liable as a contributory infringer.
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2012).  It reduces to three basic requirements: (1) a sale, offer to sell,
or importation of (2) a component of the patented invention with (3) no substantial non-
infringing uses.  The Supreme Court also clarified in Aro Manufacturing Co. v. Convertible
Top Replacement Co., 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964), that liability for contributory infringement
requires the contributory infringer to know that the combination was both patented and
infringed, creating a fourth, knowledge requirement.
15 See Lynda J. Oswald, The Intent Element of “Inducement to Infringe” Under Patent Law:
Reflections on Grokster, 13 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 225, 229–31 (2006) (discuss-
ing the evolution of § 271(b) doctrine).
16 377 U.S. 476 (1964).
17 The Supreme Court addressed 35 U.S.C. § 271(d) in Dawson Chemical Co. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), a provision that places limits on a patent misuse defense,
which often arises in the context of contributory infringement.  But the Court did not
address the substance of either § 271(b) or § 271(c).
18 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919–20 (2005).
19 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
20 Id. at 439–42.
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patent.21  Drawing on the idea of substantial non-infringing uses, the
Supreme Court in Sony concluded that the manufacturers of VCRs were not
liable for contributory copyright infringement because VCRs had such a non-
infringing use: allowing people to tape shows to watch at a later time.22
Many thought that Grokster would address the same issue—whether file-
sharing networks had substantial non-infringing uses, such as sharing files
that were not subject to copyright or for which the copyright owner had
granted permission.23  Those expectations were not realized.  The Supreme
Court in Grokster dodged the “substantial non-infringing uses” question24 and
instead imported active inducement of infringement into copyright law from
patent law.25  The Court held that “one who distributes a device with the
object of promoting its use to infringe copyright, as shown by clear expres-
sion or other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, is liable for the
resulting acts of infringement by third parties.”26
In embracing active inducement of infringement for copyright law, the
Supreme Court discussed the requisite mental state for an inducer.  The
Court noted that inducement “premises liability on purposeful, culpable
expression and conduct.”27  In the Court’s view, Groskter and StreamCast
possessed the required, nefarious intent: “Grokster and StreamCast’s efforts
to supply services to former Napster users, deprived of a mechanism to copy
and distribute what were overwhelmingly infringing files, indicate a princi-
pal, if not exclusive, intent on the part of each to bring about infringe-
ment.”28  Ultimately, the Court concluded that “[t]he unlawful objective is
unmistakable.”29
Although Grokster was a copyright case, it quickly proved to be influential
in patent law.  The Federal Circuit relied upon Grokster to resolve a split in its
21 35 U.S.C. § 271(c); see also Sony, 464 U.S. at 441 (“These cases deny the patentee any
right to control the distribution of unpatented articles unless they are ‘unsuited for any
commercial noninfringing use.’” (quoting Dawson Chemical Co., 448 U.S. at 198)).
22 Sony, 464 U.S. at 456.  The Court concluded time-shifting was non-infringing
because it constitutes fair use. Id. at 454–55.
23 See Holbrook, Intent Element, supra note 5, at 399. R
24 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 934 (2005)
(“[W]e do not revisit Sony further, as MGM requests, to add a more quantified description
of the point of balance between protection and commerce when liability rests solely on
distribution with knowledge that unlawful use will occur.”).  Justice Ginsburg, concurring,
did offer an elaboration on Sony with respect to the facts of this case, see id. at 942–49
(Ginsburg, J., concurring), generating a disagreement with Justice Breyer, see id. at 949
(Breyer, J., concurring) (“Other Members of the Court, however, take up the Sony ques-
tion . . . . I write to explain why I disagree with them on this matter.”).  This splinter may
explain why the Court chose the inducement route.
25 Id. at 936 (majority opinion) (“For the same reasons that Sony took the staple-article
doctrine of patent law as a model for its copyright safe-harbor rule, the inducement rule,
too, is a sensible one for copyright.”).
26 Id. at 936–37.
27 Id. at 937.
28 Id. at 939.
29 Id. at 940.
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case law regarding the required mental state for a party to be liable for induc-
ing infringement.30  Federal Circuit decisions had articulated two inconsis-
tent standards for required intent.  The first standard required the inducer to
have the intent to induce the acts that constitute direct infringement.31
Under this broad test, an inducer need not know that the induced acts actu-
ally did constitute infringement to be liable.  The other standard required an
intent to induce infringement.32  This narrower standard required the
inducer to know that the induced acts would constitute infringement, which
also would require knowledge of the patent.33
Prior to Grokster, the Federal Circuit had avoided resolving the internal
split a number of times.34  After Grokster, the court finally held en banc that
the latter, narrower standard was correct.35  In reaching this conclusion, the
Federal Circuit relied upon the language in Grokster discussing the mental
states of Grokster and StreamCast.  The court noted that “Grokster, thus, vali-
dates this court’s articulation of the state of mind requirement for induce-
ment.”36  Specifically, the Federal Circuit reasoned that “Grokster has clarified
that the intent requirement for inducement requires more than just intent to
cause the acts that produce direct infringement.  Beyond that threshold
knowledge, the inducer must have an affirmative intent to cause direct
30 See Mark A. Lemley, Inducing Patent Infringement, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 225, 240
(2005) (“This division in authority has continued to plague the courts.  Federal Circuit and
district court opinions have variously followed both standards, though they lean heavily
toward the Manville approach.  The Federal Circuit has tried without success to reconcile
the standards.” (footnote omitted)); Oswald, supra note 15, at 231 (“The Federal Circuit
has acknowledged a sharp intra-circuit split in its jurisprudence relating to the type of
intent required to support an inducement of infringement action under section 271(b) of
the Patent Act.”); Michael N. Rader, Toward a Coherent Law of Inducement to Infringe: Why the
Federal Circuit Should Adopt the Hewlett-Packard Standard for Intent Under § 271(b), 10 FED.
CIR. B.J. 299, 300 (2000) (“By issuing conflicting decisions on the matter, the Federal Cir-
cuit has created a great deal of uncertainty in district courts as to the controlling
standard.”).
31 Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
32 Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 553 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
33 Cf. Lemley, supra note 30, at 238 (“The Hewlett-Packard court did not require that
the defendant have any awareness of the patent, much less intend to infringe it . . . .”).
34 MEMC Elec. Materials, Inc. v. Mitsubishi Materials Silicon Corp., 420 F.3d 1369,
1378 n.4 (Fed. Cir. 2005); MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1332 (Fed.
Cir. 2005), vacated and remanded, eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006)
(“[T]here is a ‘lack of clarity concerning whether the required intent must be merely to
induce the specific acts [of infringement] or additionally to cause an infringement.’”
(quoting Insituform Techs., Inc. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 385 F.3d 1360, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2004))); Insituform Techs., 385 F.3d at 1378 (“[W]e need not resolve any ambiguity in the
case law on this point because there is sufficient evidence to support the district court’s
finding under either standard.”); see also Lemley, supra note 30, at 240.
35 DSU Medical Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304–06 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in
relevant part).
36 Id. at 1306.
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infringement.”37  Thus, in the eyes of the Federal Circuit, Grokster resolved
the court’s intra-circuit split on the mental state issue.
B. The Supreme Court Revisits Induced Infringement in
Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A.
The certainty about the mental state requirement was short-lived, how-
ever.38  In SEB S.A. v. Montgomery Ward & Co., the Federal Circuit addressed
whether a party could possess the required knowledge of the patent under
DSU even if she was unaware of the actual patent at issue.39  The court con-
cluded that deliberate indifference towards the risk there is a patent sufficed
to demonstrate knowledge of the patent.40  Drawing on specific intent from
other civil contexts, the court defined “deliberate indifference” as “a subjec-
tive determination that the defendant knew of and disregarded the overt risk
that an element of the offense existed.”41  Such indifference “is not different
from actual knowledge, but is a form of actual knowledge.”42  In this way, the
court appeared to broaden the knowledge and intent standard that it
recently had narrowed in DSU.43
The Supreme Court granted certiorari, however, and modified the stan-
dard.  In Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., the Court first addressed a
threshold issue that it had never considered before: is there a knowledge
requirement for § 271(b) at all?44  The Court concluded there is, though it
was a close call.  After concluding that the statutory language did not answer
the question, the Court revisited its decision in Aro Manufacturing. Co. v. Con-
vertible Top Replacement Co. (Aro II).  In Aro II, the Court held, five to four, that
there was a knowledge requirement for contributory infringement under
§ 271(c).45  The Court in Global-Tech noted that
37 Id.
38 Jason A. Rantanen, An Objective View of Fault in Patent Infringement, 60 AM. U. L. REV.
1575, 1579 (2011) (“Even after the Federal Circuit theoretically settled the mental state
requirement of inducement once and for all in DSU Medical v. JMS, subsequent panels and
scholars continued to disagree on its interpretation.” (footnote omitted)).
39 594 F.3d 1360, 1375–76 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) (2012)).
40 Id. at 1376–77.
41 Id. at 1376 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 840 (1994)).
42 Id. at 1377 (citing United States v. Carani, 492 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir. 2007); Wood-
man v. WWOR-TV, Inc., 411 F.3d 69, 84 n.14 (2d Cir. 2005)).
43 The court explicitly distinguished DSU:
The facts of DSU Medical did not require this court to address the scope of
the knowledge requirement for intent.  Instead, the court resolved conflicting
case law setting forth both a requirement to knowingly induce infringement and
to merely knowingly induce the acts that constitute direct infringement.  In other
words, the court decided the target of the knowledge, not the nature of that
knowledge.
SEB, 594 F.3d at 1376 (citations omitted).
44 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011).
45 377 U.S. 476, 488 (1964).
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[w]hile there is much to be said in favor of both views expressed in Aro
II, the “holding in Aro II has become a fixture in the law of contributory
infringement under [section] 271(c),”—so much so that SEB has not asked
us to overrule it.  Nor has Congress seen fit to alter § 271(c)’s intent require-
ment in the nearly half a century since Aro II was decided.  In light of the
“‘special force’” of the doctrine of stare decisis with regard to questions of
statutory interpretation, we proceed on the premise that § 271(c) requires
knowledge of the existence of the patent that is infringed.
Based on this premise, it follows that the same knowledge is needed for
induced infringement under § 271(b).46
Consequently, the Court held “that induced infringement under § 271(b)
requires knowledge that the induced acts constitute patent infringement.”47
After concluding that inducement under § 271(b) requires knowledge
of the patent, the Court then elaborated on what constitutes such knowledge.
Rejecting the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” test, the Court
instead adopted criminal law’s “willful blindness” standard for the knowledge
requirement.48  Willful blindness requires that “(1) the defendant must sub-
jectively believe that there is a high probability that a fact exists and (2) the
defendant must take deliberate actions to avoid learning of that fact.”49  The
Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” was not the appropriate standard,
according to the Court, because “it permits a finding of knowledge when
there is merely a ‘known risk’ that the induced acts are infringing” and
because it “does not require active efforts by an inducer to avoid knowing
about the infringing nature of the activities.”50
The Supreme Court’s decision in Global-Tech is a middle-of-the-road
answer to the issue of knowledge.  By adopting a knowledge requirement, the
Court avoided making induced infringement a form of strict liability, which
could ensnare truly innocent actors.  By definition, the inducer’s own activi-
ties are not infringing, yet they would be liable for the acts of others even if
they were ignorant of the patent.  With the knowledge requirement, parties
are liable only if they are, in some sense, a bad actor.
The Court could have gone to the other extreme as well, requiring a
party to have actual knowledge of the patent.  Neither willful blindness nor
deliberate indifference would suffice.  This would be a far narrower
approach, one which parties could game by “playing ostrich” to avoid liabil-
ity, at least as to past damages.  To avoid any liability for inducement, a party
46 Glob.-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (alterations in original) (citations omitted) (quoting 5
R. CARL MOY, MOY’S WALKER ON PATENTS § 15:20, at 15–131 (4th ed. 2009)).
47 Id.  For an argument that both Aro II and Glob.-Tech are wrong for requiring knowl-
edge of patent infringement, see generally Ted Sichelman, Patent Law Revisionism at the
Supreme Court?, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 307, 339 (2013).
48 Glob.-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2068 (“[D]eliberate indifference to a known risk that a pat-
ent exists is not the appropriate standard under § 271(b).  We nevertheless affirm the judg-
ment of the Court of Appeals because the evidence in this case was plainly sufficient to
support a finding of Pentalpha’s knowledge under the doctrine of willful blindness.”).
49 Id. at 2070.
50 Id. at 2071.
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would simply refuse to review patents.  The Court’s “willful blindness” stan-
dard avoids this potential gamesmanship.  But “willful blindness” is not as
capacious as the Federal Circuit’s “deliberate indifference” standard, striking
a careful balance by ensuring that the actor affirmatively maintains her igno-
rance.  Overall, the Court balanced the interest in preventing parties from
burying their heads in the sand to avoid liability with a concern of ensnaring
arguably innocent parties through § 271(b).
C. The Supreme Court Responds to the Federal Circuit’s Attempt to Redefine
Induced Infringement: Limelight Networks, Inc. v.
Akamai Technologies, Inc.
Although it took over fifty years for the Court to address § 271(b) for the
first time in the patent context, it took a mere three years for the Court to
revisit the provision in Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc.51
This time, however, the issue was not the mental state required for induced
infringement.  Instead, the Court rejected an attempt by the Federal Circuit
to morph active inducement in a way to combat what has been dubbed
“divided infringement.”52
Divided infringement arises when multiple parties perform the steps of a
patented method, but no single party performs all of the steps.  For example,
the claim may require steps A, B, and C.  Suppose that Attila performs steps A
and B, but Bubba then performs step C.53  The patented process has been
performed but not by a single entity.  Under Federal Circuit law, to infringe a
method claim, generally all of the steps must be performed by a single
entity.54  Here, there would be no infringement because neither Attila nor
Bubba performs all the steps of the claimed method.
The exception to the “single entity” rule is when activities of a third party
are attributable to the accused infringer such that the accused infringer
should be deemed responsible for performance of those steps.  So, if there is
a reason to attribute Bubba’s performance of step C to Attila, then Attila
would be liable as the direct infringer.  Under Federal Circuit law, attribution
is appropriate when the accused infringer exercises “ ‘control or direction’
over the entire process such that every step is attributable to the controlling
party, i.e., the ‘mastermind.’”55  This “control or direction” test “is satisfied in
situations where the law would traditionally hold the accused direct infringer
vicariously liable for the acts committed by another party that are required to
complete performance of a claimed method.”56
51 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014).
52 Mark A. Lemley et al., Divided Infringment Claims, 33 AIPLA Q.J. 255 (2005).
53 Attila and Bubba are my dogs.
54 See Muniauction, Inc. v. Thomson Corp., 532 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2008); BMC
Res., Inc. v. Paymentech L.P., 498 F.3d 1373, 1378–79 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
55 Muniauction, 532 F.3d at 1329 (quoting BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1381).
56 Id. at 1330 (citing BMC Res., 498 F.3d at 1379; Int’l Rectifier v. Samsung Elecs. Co.,
361 F.3d 1355, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004)).
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The Federal Circuit sought to clarify the “control or direction” test in
Akamai Technologies, Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc.57  In so doing, it dramati-
cally altered the test.  The court reasoned that
[w]hile control or direction is a consideration, as is the extent to which
instructions, if any, may be provided, what is essential is not merely the exer-
cise of control or the providing of instructions, but whether the relationship
between the parties is such that acts of one may be attributed to the other.58
According to the court, attribution is appropriate in only two circum-
stances: “when there is an agency relationship between the parties who per-
form the method steps or when one party is contractually obligated to the
other to perform the steps.”59
This narrowing of the “control or direction” test seemingly was to be
short-lived because the Federal Circuit agreed to rehear the case en banc.60
The court appeared to want to revisit the single-entity rule.  The question
presented was: “If separate entities each perform separate steps of a method
claim, under what circumstances would that claim be directly infringed and
to what extent would each of the parties be liable?”61
The court also took a second case en banc, McKesson Technologies, Inc. v.
Epic Systems Corporation62 that presented a slightly different issue of divided
infringement.  The defendant in Akamai performed some of the steps (and
its customers performed the balance of the steps).  In contrast, the defendant
in McKesson performed none of the steps; instead the steps of the process
were performed by two different actors: doctors and patients.63  The defen-
dant’s liability in McKesson, therefore, depended entirely on a theory of
induced infringement under § 271(b).  The court posed the following ques-
tions in McKesson: “1. If separate entities each perform separate steps of a
method claim, under what circumstances, if any, would either entity or any
third party be liable for inducing infringement or for contributory infringe-
ment?” and “2. Does the nature of the relationship between the relevant
actors—e.g., service provider/user; doctor/patient—affect the question of
direct or indirect infringement liability?”64  All of the questions presented
57 629 F.3d 1311, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2011), reh’g en banc granted, vacated, 419 F. App’x 989
(Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per curiam), rev’d and remanded, 692 F.3d 1301 (Fed. Cir.
2012) (en banc), rev’d and remanded, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134
S. Ct. 895 (2014), aff’d, 786 F.3d 899 (2015).
58 Akamai Techs., 629 F.3d at 1319.
59 Id. at 1320.
60 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. MIT, 419 F. App’x 989 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en banc) (per
curiam).
61 Id. at 989; see also Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 692 F.3d 1301,
1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam).
62 McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., No. 2010-1291, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS
7531, at *1 (U.S. Apr.18, 2014).  Although the decision issued as a precedential one, it was
never printed in the Federal Reporter given the grant of en banc review.
63 Id. at *7–11.
64 McKesson Techs. Inc. v. Epic Sys. Corp., 463 F. App’x 906, 907 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (en
banc) (citation omitted).
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strongly suggested that the Federal Circuit was going to revisit the “single
entity” rule for direct infringement of patented methods.
Any such expectations were dashed when the opinion was issued.
Instead of addressing the direct infringement standard, the court left its
prior law in place.  In order to address the policy concerns of divided
infringement, the court chose to rework the standard for inducing infringe-
ment under § 271(b).65  The court held that a party could be liable for active
inducement of infringement even if no single party performed all the steps
of the claimed method, so long as all of the steps were performed by some-
one.66  In the court’s view, “[r]equiring proof that there has been direct
infringement as a predicate for induced infringement is not the same as
requiring proof that a single party would be liable as a direct infringer.”67
Thus, a party could be liable for active inducement of infringement if it per-
formed some steps of the method and induced others to perform the remain-
ing steps (per the Akamai fact scenario)68 or if a party induced multiple
parties to perform all of the steps (per the McKesson scenario),69 even though
there would be no individual who could be liable for direct infringement.70
The Supreme Court agreed to review the active inducement issue71 but
declined to take up the direct infringement issue.72  Before the grant of certi-
orari, however, the McKesson case settled.73 McKesson was the one in which
active inducement had been the issue all along, not Akamai.  That left Akamai
in an odd position: defending the Federal Circuit’s holding on active induce-
ment even though that issue was never present in its case prior to the Federal
Circuit’s en banc decision.  Consequently and unsurprisingly, Akamai tried to
65 Akamai, 692 F.3d at 1306, rev’d, Limelight Networks Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134
S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (“Much of the briefing in these cases has been directed to the question
whether direct infringement can be found when no single entity performs all of the
claimed steps of the patent.  It is not necessary for us to resolve that issue today because we
find that these cases and cases like them can be resolved through an application of the
doctrine of induced infringement.”).
66 Id. (“To be clear, we hold that all the steps of a claimed method must be performed
in order to find induced infringement, but that it is not necessary to prove that all the steps
were committed by a single entity.”).
67 Id. at 1308–09 (emphasis omitted).
68 Id. at 1309 (“[A] party who performs some of the steps itself and induces another to
perform the remaining steps that constitute infringement has precisely the same impact on
the patentee as a party who induces a single person to carry out all of the steps.”).
69 Id. (“A party who knowingly induces others to engage in acts that collectively prac-
tice the steps of the patented method—and those others perform those acts—has had
precisely the same impact on the patentee as a party who induces the same infringement
by a single direct infringer; there is no reason, either in the text of the statute or in the
policy underlying it, to treat the two inducers differently.”).
70 For a discussion and critique of the Federal Circuit’s decision, see W. Keith Robin-
son, No “Direction” Home: An Alternative Approach to Joint Infringement, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 59
(2012).
71 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 895 (2014).
72 Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2723 (2014).
73 Epic Sys. Corp. v. McKesson Techs., Inc., 133 S. Ct. 1520 (2013).
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go outside of the question presented regarding active inducement and
addressed the single entity rule under § 271(a).74
During oral argument, the Supreme Court seemed interested in the Fed-
eral Circuit’s single-entity rule for § 271(a),75 but in the decision, the Court
only addressed the active inducement question.76  The Court rejected the
Federal Circuit’s attempt to manipulate § 271(b) to deal with the divided
74 See Brief for Respondents at 19–36, Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (No. 12-786) (arguing that § 271(a) was “fairly included” in the
question presented and arguing the merits of divided infringement as its primary
argument).
75 Many of the questions involved the ability to evade patent protection by having
another party perform a step of the method, which is the § 271(a) question, not § 271(b).
See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 5, Limelight, 134 S. Ct. 2111 (2014) (No. 12-786)
(Chief Justice Roberts noting that “[a]ll you’ve got to do is find one step in the process and
essentially outsource it or—or make it attractive for someone else to perform that particu-
lar step and you’ve essentially invalidated the patent.”); id. at 10 (Justice Ginsburg asking,
“[D]idn’t the parties brief, what is it, 271(1) or—and then the Federal Circuit decided it
on sub (2)”); id. at 12–13 (Justice Kagan noting that “if [the Federal Circuit] did reach it a
second time around and they decided well, now that this inducement theory is not availa-
ble to us, we think that there is a real problem here . . . so we’re going to change what we
think on the 271(a) question, if they did that, it would be right to say it would render our
opinion on the 271(b) question a nullity”); id. at 15 (Justice Alito noting that “you’re
asking us to decide a question . . . that is . . . of no significance unless the ruling on (a)
stands”); id. at 26 (Justice Sotomayor asking whether “there’s some kind of method patents
that simply cannot be drafted from the perspective of a single entity”).
76 Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2120 (2014) (“Respondents ask us to review the merits of the
Federal Circuit’s Muniauction rule for direct infringement under § 271(a).  We decline to
do so today.”).  The Court noted that “the Federal Circuit will have the opportunity to
revisit the § 271(a) question if it so chooses.” Id.
The Federal Circuit initially declined to revisit the § 271(a) issue en banc and
remanded the case to the original panel, with a substitute judge due to the retirement of
an original panel member. See Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 571 F.
App’x 958, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam).  The panel applied its prior
single-entity rule and found no infringement, Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks,
Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 2015), over a strong dissent from the new panel
member, id. at 915–32 (Moore, J., dissenting).  The en banc court then unanimously
rejected the panel’s methodology and changed the rule for divided infringement under
§ 271(a).  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1023 (Fed. Cir.
2015).  Specifically, the en banc court concluded “[w]e will hold an entity responsible for
others’ performance of method steps in two sets of circumstances: (1) where that entity
directs or controls others’ performance, and (2) where the actors form a joint enterprise.”
Id. at 1022.  Overall, the court left the inquiry rather open-ended: “Section 271(a) is not
limited solely to principal-agent relationships, contractual arrangements, and joint enter-
prise, as the vacated panel decision held.  Rather, to determine direct infringement, we
consider whether all method steps can be attributed to a single entity.” Id. at 1023 (foot-
note omitted).  As to this particular case, the court concluded “liability under § 271(a) can
also be found when an alleged infringer conditions participation in an activity or receipt of
a benefit upon performance of a step or steps of a patented method and establishes the
manner or timing of that performance.” Id. (citing Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v.
Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 930 (2005)).
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infringement problem.77  The Supreme Court made clear that there must be
an act of direct infringement, and thus a direct infringer, for a party to be
liable for actively inducing infringement.78  The Court rejected the Federal
Circuit’s reasoning in less than flattering terms, noting that “[t]he Federal
Circuit’s analysis fundamentally misunderstands what it means to infringe a
method patent.”79  According to the Supreme Court, the Federal Circuit’s
approach “would deprive § 271(b) of ascertainable standards.  If a defendant
can be held liable under § 271(b) for inducing conduct that does not consti-
tute infringement, then how can a court assess when a patent holder’s rights
have been invaded?”80  The Court’s holding avoided other potential compli-
cations with the Federal Circuit’s approach, such as significant public notice
concerns81 and the untethering of any territorial limits from § 271(b).82
As a result, the Supreme Court reinstated the natural link between
§ 271(a) (and potentially other direct infringement provisions) and active
inducement under § 271(b).  The various limitations of § 271(a) now limit
the scope of active inducement as well.83
77 Limelight, 134 S. Ct. at 2115 (“This case presents the question whether a defendant
may be liable for inducing infringement of a patent under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one
has directly infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any other statutory provision.  The
statutory text and structure and our prior case law require that we answer this question in
the negative.”).
78 Id. at 2117 (“[T]here has simply been no infringement of the method in which
respondents have staked out an interest, because the performance of all the patent’s steps
is not attributable to any one person.  And, as both the Federal Circuit and respondents
admit, where there has been no direct infringement, there can be no inducement of
infringement under § 271(b).”).
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Mark D. Janis & Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Law’s Audience, 97 MINN. L. REV. 72,
118–20 (2012) (discussing advantages and disadvantages of the Federal Circuit’s approach
based on public notice concerns).
82 See generally Timothy R. Holbrook, The Potential Extraterritorial Consequences of
Akamai, 26 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 499 (2012) (arguing that the Federal Circuit unintention-
ally had removed territorial limits and implicitly overruled NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion,
Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282, 1318 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
83 On remand, the Federal Circuit—after a circuitous path—addressed the issue of
direction and control.  The Federal Circuit initially refused to take Akamai back en banc,
and a panel of the court heard the case on remand.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight
Networks, Inc., 571 Fed. App’x 958, 958–59 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (en banc) (per curiam).  The
panel upheld the same standard, with a sharp dissent by Judge Moore.  Akamai Techs., Inc.
v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 786 F.3d 899, 903–04 (Fed. Cir. 2015); id. at 915–32 (Moore,
J., dissenting).  The court subsequently granted rehearing en banc, Akamai Techs., Inc. v.
Limelight Networks, Inc., 612 Fed. App’x 617, 617–18 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (per
curiam), and issued a succinct decision that broadened the circumstances when a party can
be held liable for direct infringement in these divided infringement scenarios, Akamai
Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 797 F.3d 1020, 1022–23 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc)
(per curiam).  The court finally resolved all remaining issues before it in November 2015,
although the litigation is ongoing.  Akamai Techs., Inc. v. Limelight Networks, Inc., 805
F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
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D. A Return to—and Narrowing of—the Mental State Requirement in
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc.
Within one year, § 271(b) was back before the Supreme Court.  The
issue presented in Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Systems, Inc. was seemingly nar-
row: whether an infringer’s good faith belief that the patent at issue is invalid
should negate the scienter requirement for inducing patent infringement.84
In Global-Tech, the Supreme Court held that knowledge both of the patent
and that the induced acts constituted infringement were necessary for
induced infringement.85  An accused infringer could have the requisite
knowledge, however, if it willfully blinded itself to the existence of the pat-
ent.86  What if, however, the accused inducer had investigated that patent
and came to believe, in good faith, that the patent was invalid, even if the
induced acts infringed? Commil addressed whether such a good faith belief
negated the scienter requirement and thus immunized the inducer from
liability.87
The Federal Circuit held that such a belief was sufficient to negate the
requisite mental state.  The court reasoned that one cannot infringe an inva-
lid patent.88  As such, “one could be aware of a patent and induce another to
perform the steps of the patent claim, but have a good faith belief that the
patent is not valid.  Under those circumstances, it can hardly be said that the
alleged inducer intended to induce infringement.”89  Consequently, such
belief “may negate the specific intent to encourage another’s infringement,
which is required for induced infringement.”90
At oral argument at the Supreme Court, some of the Justices seemed
sympathetic to the Federal Circuit’s holding.  For example, Justice Kagan
noted the link between claim construction, infringement, and invalidity:
[S]uppose I have a product and I’m trying to figure out whether, if I sell this
product, I’ll have liability.  And there are two ways to construe . . . a patent;
one is narrow and one is broad.  And if the patent is construed narrowly, I
won’t be infringing it.  But if the patent is construed broadly, it’s not
valid . . . . So I have two possible defenses, depending on whether the patent
is construed narrowly or the patent is construed broadly.
84 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
85 Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (“[W]e now
hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts
constitute patent infringement.”).
86 Id. at 2070–71.
87 Or, at least, only pre-suit liability. See infra Section III.B.
88 See Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2013),
vacated and remanded, 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015).
89 Id.
90 Id.  The court noted that the district courts that had considered the issue had
reached the same conclusion. Id.  Judge Newman dissented, noting that “[a] good-faith
belief of patent invalidity may be raised as a defense to willfulness of the infringement, but
it is not a defense to the fact of infringement.” Id. at 1373 (Newman, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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Now, Global-Tech says that I have a good faith defense as to non-infringe-
ment, but you’re suggesting I don’t have that good faith defense as to inva-
lidity.  And I guess I don’t understand quite why that would make sense in
the context I’m talking about . . . .91
At other times, though, the Justices seemed skeptical about affording a
defense based on an ultimately incorrect affirmative defense.92
Interestingly, both Commil and the United States as amicus argued that
neither a good faith belief in invalidity nor non-infringement would negate the
scienter requirement for inducement because the inducer need not have
knowledge that the induced acts constitute infringement.93  Commil’s argu-
ments were understandable because it was making the arguments needed to
win the case: eliminating the scienter requirement would be a clean win.
The United States’ position was surprising, however, given the clear language
in Global-Tech that induced infringement required knowledge that the
induced acts infringed the patent.94  Notably, the United States did not par-
ticipate in the Global-Tech case in any form, neither through an amicus brief
nor at oral argument.  The norm in patent cases at the Supreme Court is for
the United States to participate as an amicus.95  There is nothing in the pub-
91 Transcript of Oral Argument at 9–10, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135
S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896).
92 Id. at 31 (Chief Justice Roberts stating that “if you regard the patent as law, it seems
to me that your position is really just ignorance of the law as an excuse”); id. at 33 (Justice
Kagan stating that “if the contract was valid, you lose even though you thought the contract
was invalid.  And so, too, here it would seem to me”).
93 Brief of Petitioner at 21–44, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d 1361
(Fed. Cir. 2013) (No. 13-896); Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 9–18, Commil, 135 S. Ct. 1920 (No. 13-896).
94 Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2068 (2011) (“Accordingly,
we now hold that induced infringement under § 271(b) requires knowledge that the
induced acts constitute patent infringement.”).  It is also surprising given that the patent
act specifically contemplates opinions of counsel having relevance in assessing active
inducement. See 35 U.S.C. § 298 (2012) (“The failure of an infringer to obtain the advice
of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent, or the failure of the infringer to
present such advice to the court or jury, may not be used to prove . . . that the infringer
intended to induce infringement of the patent.”).  This provision was added to the patent
statute by the America Invents Act (AIA). See America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125
Stat. 284, § 17 (2011) (codified at 35 U.S.C. § 298).
95 Since the 2004 term, the United States participated as amicus in each of the follow-
ing patent cases at the Supreme Court: Kimble v. Marvel Entertainment, LLC, 135 S. Ct. 2401
(2015); Teva Pharmaceutical USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 831 (2015); Alice Corp. Pty.
Ltd. v. CLS Bank International, 134 S. Ct. 2347 (2014); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments,
Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014); Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Technologies, Inc., 134 S. Ct.
2111 (2014); Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749 (2014);
Highmark Inc. v. Allcare Health Management System, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1744 (2014); Medtronic,
Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC., 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v.
Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2107 (2013); Bowman v. Monsanto Co., 133 S. Ct. 1761
(2013); Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories, Ltd. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 132 S. Ct. 1670 (2012);
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289 (2012); Microsoft
Corp. v. i4i Ltd. Partnership, 131 S. Ct. 2238 (2011); Board of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior
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lic record explaining the government’s conspicuous absence from Global-
Tech, but it explains why the United States took this opportunity to now push
back against the Court’s holding.  The Supreme Court, though, was not
impressed with this position at oral argument.96
Ultimately the Supreme Court rejected Commil’s and the United States’
efforts to overrule Global-Tech.97  The Court made clear that the inducer must
be aware that the induced acts are infringing:
Qualifying or limiting [Global-Tech’s] holding, as the Government and Com-
mil seek to do, would lead to the conclusion, both in inducement and con-
tributory infringement cases, that a person, or entity, could be liable even
though he did not know the acts were infringing.  In other words, even if the
defendant reads the patent’s claims differently from the plaintiff, and that
reading is reasonable, he would still be liable because he knew the acts
might infringe. Global-Tech requires more.  It requires proof the defendant
knew the acts were infringing.  And the Court’s opinion was clear in
rejecting any lesser mental state as the standard.98
The Court thus emphatically closed the door on efforts to end-run Global-
Tech.
Although the Court did not go as far as requested by the United States,
ultimately the Court did reject the Federal Circuit’s position, drawing a line
between a good faith belief that the induced acts did not infringe and one
that the patent is invalid.99  The Court held that “because infringement and
validity are separate issues under the Act, belief regarding validity cannot
negate the scienter required under § 271(b).”100  To hold otherwise “would
conflate the issues of infringement and validity.”101  The Court also felt that
“[a]llowing this new defense would . . . undermine” the statutory presump-
University v. Roche Molecular Systems, Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188 (2011); Quanta Computer, Inc. v. LG
Electronics, Inc., 553 U.S. 617 (2008); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 550 U.S. 437 (2007);
KSR International Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398 (2007); MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.,
549 U.S. 118 (2007); Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc., 548
U.S. 124 (2006); eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006); Illinois Tool Works
Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006); Unitherm Food System, Inc. v. Swift-Eckrich,
Inc., 546 U.S. 394 (2006); and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193 (2005).
Which is to say, basically all of the patent cases, except for Global-Tech.
96 See, e.g., Transcript of Oral Argument at 17–18, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys.,
Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896) (Justice Kagan noting, “we just said, we now hold
that induced infringement under 271(b) requires knowledge that the induced acts consti-
tute patent infringement.  And your brief essentially puts a ‘not’ in that sentence.”); id. at
18–19 (Justice Scalia asking “[a]re we that dumb, that . . . we would say those two things in
successive sentences?”); id. at 25 (Chief Justice Roberts noting that “[w]hat you just said
does sound like an argument that Global-Tech was—was wrong.”).
97 Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1927 (“Accepting the Government and Commil’s argument
would require this Court to depart from its prior holding.”).
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tion that an issued patent’s claims are valid.102  Acknowledging that one can-
not infringe an invalid patent, the Court nevertheless emphasized that
“[v]alidity and infringement are distinct issues, bearing different burdens,
different presumptions, and different evidence.”103
The Court also relied on a variety of pragmatic reasons for rejecting the
Federal Circuit’s rule.  The Court emphasized a number of options that
potential inducers had to challenge the patent’s validity if they held such a
belief.  For example, parties could file a declaratory judgment action or avail
themselves of the various post-issuance administrative proceedings at the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (PTO).104  The Court was also
concerned that an accused inducer could easily evade liability by offering a
colorable invalidity argument: “accused inducers would likely find it easier to
prevail on a defense regarding the belief of invalidity than noninfringe-
ment.”105  Exploration of such a good faith belief would also “increase dis-
covery costs and multiply the issues the jury must resolve.  Indeed, the jury
would be put to the difficult task of separating the defendant’s belief regard-
ing validity from the actual issue of validity.”106
The Court concluded with a somewhat odd rumination on the existence
of patent assertion entities (PAEs), often referred to pejoratively as “patent
trolls.”107  The majority appears to embrace the normative view that PAEs are
categorically problematic, noting their behavior can “impose a ‘harmful tax
on innovation.’”108  While admitting that the issue of PAEs is not an issue in
102 Id. at 1928–29; see also 35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed
valid. . . . The burden of establishing invalidity of a patent or any claim thereof shall rest on
the party asserting such invalidity.”).
103 Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1929 (quoting Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 720 F.3d
1361, 1374 (Newman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
104 Id.
105 Id. at 1930.
106 Id.
107 Indeed, it was rather startling to find the use of the pejorative “patent troll” term
appear in Justice Scalia’s dissent. See id. at 1932 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“I may add, how-
ever, that if the desirability of the rule we adopt were a proper consideration, it is by no
means clear that the Court’s holding, which increases the in terrorem power of patent trolls,
is preferable.”).  Whether patent assertion entities are categorically a problem is the sub-
ject of debate. See, e.g., Colleen V. Chien, From Arms Race to Marketplace: The Complex Patent
Ecosystem and Its Implications for the Patent System, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 297, 328 (2010); Robin
Feldman & Mark A. Lemley, Do Patent Licensing Demands Mean Innovation?, 101 IOWA L.
REV. 137 (2015); Ryan T. Holte, Trolls or Great Inventors: Case Studies of Patent Assertion Enti-
ties, 59 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1 (2015); Kristen Osenga, Formerly Manufacturing Entities: Piercing
the “Patent Troll” Rhetoric, 47 CONN. L. REV. 435 (2014); Timothy R. Holbrook, Opinion, Not
All Patent Trolls Are Demons, CNN (9:08 AM, Feb. 21, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/
02/21/opinion/holbrook-patent-trolls-demons/; Robin Feldman et al., The AIA 500
Expanded: The Effects of Patent Monetization Entities, (U.C. Hastings Research Paper No. 45,
2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2247195.
108 Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1930 (citing Prepared Statement of the Fed. Trade Comm’n on Discus-
sion Draft of Patent Demand Letter Litig. Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Mfg., and Trade of the
H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 113th Cong. 2 (2014)).
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the case, the Court nevertheless felt it “necessary and proper to stress that
district courts have the authority and responsibility to ensure frivolous cases
are dissuaded.”109  Such advisory language appears to be the Court’s effort to
step into the fray on PAEs and the proposed Congressional legislation to
address these concerns.  The section, however, is an odd appendage to the
decision.
II. THE IMPACT OF THE QUIET REVOLUTION: COMMIL’S MOVE AWAY FROM
LEAR’S POLICY OF ENCOURAGING PATENT CHALLENGES IN COURT
The Supreme Court’s recent engagement has been rather surprising,
given the existence of the Federal Circuit.  Nevertheless, most of the Court’s
decisions have come down against patents.  Such suspicion of the exclusive
power of patents, however, is not of recent vintage.  The Supreme Court has
generally expressed concern, and indeed, “antipathy,” at times to patents.110
This Section explores this hostility and the Court’s primary way of dealing
with invalid patents: encouraging validity challenges in the courts.  As this
Section explains, by reducing the incentive for actors to enter a market when
they believe a patent is invalid, the Court in Commil has undermined this
policy.
A. The Mixed Overall Impact of the Tetralogy
For some unknown reason, the Supreme Court’s reworking of active
inducement has not garnered the attention of its other recent work, particu-
larly eligible subject matter.  Admittedly, active inducement will not have the
dramatic impact on patent validity that the subject matter cases have had.
Nevertheless, this quiet revolution bears further exploration and
consideration.
The net impact of these cases generally favors patent holders, making it
easier for them to demonstrate liability under active inducement. Grokster
demonstrates a rather strong concern with infringers who flout intellectual
property rights.  Indeed, the Court went out of its way to embrace active
inducement as a means of combatting copyright infringement on peer-to-
peer networks. Global-Tech is consistent in this regard.  Although the Court
rejected the Federal Circuit’s more capacious “deliberate indifference” stan-
dard, the Court’s “willful blindness” rule also offers considerable protection
to patent owners.  The Court could have adopted a requirement for actual
knowledge of the particular patent at issue.  If they had done so, inducers
could easily have “played ostrich” and avoided liability.111  Instead, the Court
avoided this problem with the “willful blindness” standard, thereby encourag-
109 Id.
110 Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530 (1972) (“Moreover, we
must consider petitioner’s claim in light of this Nation’s historical antipathy to
monopoly . . . .”).
111 Or, if the proposal below is adopted, avoided liability for past damages but not pro-
spective relief. See infra Section III.B.
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ing potential infringers to inquire about patents.112 Limelight seems a bit of a
one-off decision, correcting an erroneous and unjustified alteration in the
law of active inducement.  It also represents a contraction of the availability
of inducement as a theory by limiting it only to circumstances where there is
an actual direct infringer.  So, of the four cases, this one does make it more
difficult for patent owners to prevail.  Finally, Commil eliminates a potential
defense to active inducement, affording § 271(b) considerably more potency
as a tool to be used by patent holders.
Closer scrutiny of Commil, particularly when coupled with Global-Tech,
reveals considerable tension between the two decisions.  Arguably the issue in
Commil is quite narrow.  The issue of a good faith belief of the invalidity of
the relevant patent would only arise when the accused inducer fails actually
to invalidate the patent in litigation.  If the accused inducer had been correct
about the patent’s validity, then she would have prevailed at trial.  Addition-
ally, the accused inducer would have had to obtain some sort of advice of
counsel regarding the patent’s validity at some point prior to the lawsuit.
This combination of requirements means the issue may not arise frequently.
Nevertheless, Commil is significant beyond its seemingly narrow issue
because it marks a step away from the Supreme Court’s historical suspicion of
the validity of most patents and its interest in encouraging parties to chal-
lenge patents through litigation. Commil represents an underappreciated
departure from this policy preference, as the balance of the next Section
elaborates.
B. Lear and the Supreme Court’s Encouragement of Patent Validity Challenges
Much of the current criticism of the patent system involves the quality of
issued patents.  Many believe that the PTO is issuing too many “bad” patents,
however that term may be defined.113  These concerns, however, are nothing
new.  The Supreme Court squarely addressed concerns about invalid patents
over fifty years ago in Lear, Inc. v. Adkins.114  Similar to Commil, the issue in
Lear was relatively narrow: whether a licensee of a patent was precluded from
challenging the validity of that patent through the doctrine of licensee estop-
pel.115  The Supreme Court concluded that there was no such preclusion,
eliminating the doctrine and allowing licensees to challenge the validity of
the licensed patents.
112 I elaborate on the considerable importance of this dynamic. See infra Section II.C.
113 Lisa Rein, Patent and Trademark Office Doesn’t Know if Examiners Are Doing Their Jobs,
Watchdog Says, WASH. POST: FED. EYE (Apr. 14, 2015), http://www.washingtonpost.com/
blogs/federal-eye/wp/2015/04/14/the-u-s-patent-and-trademark-office-doesnt-know-if-pat
ent-examiners-are-doing-their-jobs-watchdog-says/.  For a discussion of patent quality, see
generally Christi J. Guerrini, Defining Patent Quality, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 3091 (2014).
114 395 U.S. 653 (1968).
115 See id. at 661–62 (“Since the California Supreme Court’s construction of the 1955
licensing agreement is solely a matter of state law, the only issue open to us is raised by the
court’s reliance upon the doctrine of estoppel to bar Lear from proving that Adkins’ ideas
were dedicated to the common welfare by federal law.”).
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In so doing, the Supreme Court revealed its suspicions regarding the
validity of many issued patents.  The Court acknowledged its concerns with
immunizing patents from challenge by a licensee given the nature of ex parte
review at the PTO:
A patent, in the last analysis, simply represents a legal conclusion reached by
the Patent Office.  Moreover, the legal conclusion is predicated on factors as
to which reasonable men can differ widely.  Yet the Patent Office is often
obliged to reach its decision in an ex parte proceeding, without the aid of the
arguments which could be advanced by parties interested in proving patent
invalidity.  Consequently, it does not seem to us to be unfair to require a
patentee to defend the Patent Office’s judgment when his licensee places
the question in issue, especially since the licensor’s case is buttressed by the
presumption of validity which attaches to his patent.116
These concerns about the ex parte examination process suggest that the
Court doubted the validity of many of the patents issued by the PTO.  As a
result, litigation is an appropriate way to weed out the invalid patents.  This
policy of encouraging patent challenges through litigation becomes more
readily apparent with the Court’s invocation of the public interest in justify-
ing its rejection of licensee estoppel:
Surely the equities of the licensor do not weigh very heavily when they
are balanced against the important public interest in permitting full and free
competition in the use of ideas which are in reality a part of the public
domain.  Licensees may often be the only individuals with enough economic
incentive to challenge the patentability of an inventor’s discovery.  If they
are muzzled, the public may continually be required to pay tribute to would-
be monopolists without need or justification.117
The Court accordingly recognized the need to permit challenges to invalid
patents in the context of patent litigation.
The Court’s skepticism of the validity of many patents is not terribly sur-
prising, particularly given that era.  The Court similarly had embraced collat-
eral estoppel with respect to patent validity, such that effectively, once a party
manages to invalidate a patent claim, it is invalid as to the world.118  The
Court relied extensively upon Lear and its policy concerns to justify removing
the mutuality requirement.119  The Court subsequently noted the “desirabil-
ity of encouraging licensees to challenge the validity of patents, to further the
strong federal policy that only inventions which meet the rigorous require-
ments of patentability shall be withdrawn from the public domain.”120
Facilitating patent challenges generally had continued into the recent
era of Supreme Court intervention in patent law.  In MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc., the Court extended the reasoning of Lear to permit a licensee
116 Id. at 670.
117 Id.
118 Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350 (1971).
119 See, e.g., id. at 345–46, 349–50.
120 Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 264 (1979) (citing Lear, 395 U.S.
at 670–71, 673–74).
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who had not breached the license to sue to challenge the patent under the
Declaratory Judgment Act.121  The Federal Circuit had held there was no
case or controversy because the licensee did not possess a reasonable appre-
hension of being sued for patent infringement due to the existence of the
license.122  The Court rejected this formalistic rule,123 instead embracing a
more contextual analysis that was more consistent with declaratory judgment
jurisprudence outside of patent law.124  The Court specifically held that a
licensee “was not required . . . to break or terminate its . . . license agreement
before seeking a declaratory judgment in federal court that the underlying
patent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed.”125
MedImmune is an important extension of Lear.  That decision made it
easier for licensees to bring validity challenges, consistent with Lear’s rejec-
tion of licensee estoppel.  Not only are licensees no longer estopped from
challenging the patent’s validity under Lear, but now they no longer need to
“bet the farm” by breaching the license to do so.126  This is true even though
it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the patentee to sue the licensee
absent a breach.127 MedImmune, therefore, created some asymmetry between
the patent owner and the licensee.128
More recently, in Medtronic, Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, the
Court again extended the interest in generating patent validity challenges, at
least by licensees.129  In Medtronic, the Federal Circuit flipped the typical bur-
121 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
122 MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 965 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“The
district court did not err in holding that MedImmune, since under no threat or apprehen-
sion of suit, did not have standing to bring a declaratory challenge to the Cabilly II pat-
ent.”), rev’d and remanded, 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
123 MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11 (citing Cardinal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc.,
508 U.S. 83, 98 (1993); Md. Casualty Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941);
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239 (1937); Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer,
Inc., 395 F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
124 Id. at 127 (“Aetna and the cases following it do not draw the brightest of lines
between those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the case-or-controversy require-
ment and those that do not. . . . ‘Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.’” (quoting Md. Casualty Co., 312 U.S. at 273)).
125 Id. at 137.
126 Id. at 129 (citing Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926); Terrace v.
Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216 (1923); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (“Given this
genuine threat of enforcement, we did not require, as a prerequisite to testing the validity
of the law in a suit for injunction, that the plaintiff bet the farm, so to speak, by taking the
violative action.”)).
127 Medtronic Inc. v. Bos. Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d 1266, 1273 (Fed. Cir. 2012), rev’d and
remanded, Medtronic Inc. v. Mirowski Family Ventures, LLC, 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
128 The Supreme Court may have provided some more balance in a subsequent trade-
mark case. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 721, 727–28 (2013) (holding that an
“unconditional and irrevocable” covenant not to sue satisfied the voluntary cessation doc-
trine, mooting the case).
129 134 S. Ct. 843 (2014).
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den of proof in a patent case, holding that, in a declaratory judgment case,
the licensee had to prove that it did not infringe if it had not breached the
license.130  The Federal Circuit justified this holding on the asymmetry cre-
ated by MedImmune:
In this case, as sanctioned by MedImmune, the continued existence of the
license precludes the very infringement counterclaim that normally would
impose the burden of proving infringement on the patentee.  Here, Med-
tronic is shielded from any liability for infringement by its license.  And MFV
has not asserted a claim of infringement, nor could it because of the license.
Thus, while Medtronic’s suit for declaratory judgment undoubtedly rests
upon the infringement provisions laid out in § 271, the relief it seeks relates
directly to its obligations under the license.131
The Supreme Court rejected this burden shifting, holding that “the bur-
den of persuasion is with the patentee, just as it would be had the patentee
brought an infringement suit.”132  The Court reasoned that the Declaratory
Judgment Act is merely procedural and does not change any substantive
rights.133  The burden of proof, however, is substantive in nature, so the bur-
den of proving infringement remains with the patentee.134  In reaching this
conclusion, the Court relied upon the public’s “paramount interest in seeing
that patent monopolies . . . are kept within their legitimate scope.”135
Because “‘[l]icensees may often be the only individuals with enough eco-
nomic incentive’ to litigate questions of a patent’s scope,”136 the Court con-
cluded that “general public interest considerations . . . do not favor a change
in the ordinary rule imposing the burden of proving infringement upon the
patentee.”137
The Supreme Court’s policy thus appeared quite clear: there is a strong
public interest in having the scope of patents assessed, particularly with
respect to validity.  Invalid patents create barriers to competition that are not
justified.  The Supreme Court therefore generally encouraged patent validity
challenges from licensees because they may be one of the few with the eco-
nomic motivation to do so.
But what about other market actors who also might have such an incen-
tive to challenge arguably invalid patents?  One would think that the Court
130 Bos. Sci. Corp., 695 F.3d at 1274 (“[T]his court holds that in the limited circum-
stance when an infringement counterclaim by a patentee is foreclosed by the continued
existence of a license, a licensee seeking a declaratory judgment of noninfringement and
of no consequent liability under the license bears the burden of persuasion.”).
131 Id. at 1273.
132 Mirowski Family Ventures, 134 S. Ct. at 849.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id. at 851 (quoting Precision Instrument Mfg. Co. v. Auto. Maint. Mach. Co., 324
U.S. 806, 816 (1945)).
136 Id. at 852 (quoting Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 670 (1969)).
137 Id.
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would want to encourage similar challenges.  That is exactly what Global-Tech
did,138 albeit perhaps unintentionally.
C. How Global-Tech’s “Willful Blindness” Standard Advanced
the Policy of Lear
Until now, the literature—and apparently the courts—failed to appreci-
ate that Global-Tech actually facilitates the policies of Lear and its progeny to
encourage the challenge of potentially invalid patents.139  The “willful blind-
ness” standard of Global-Tech created an incentive for potential infringers to
review patents instead of burying their head in the sand.  By encouraging
market participants to review patents, such parties would make an assessment
of whether they infringe the patent and whether the patent is invalid.  If they
believe the patent is invalid, one would hope they enter the market, poten-
tially triggering a validity challenge.  If their entry is chilled, even though
they believe the patent is invalid, then the mere presence of the patent is
discouraging pro-competitive behavior.  Having would-be competitors enter
the market, potentially triggering a validity challenge, would be consistent
with Lear and indeed provides another category of those who might now have
the economic incentive to challenge a patent.  This subsection elaborates this
unintended consequence of Global-Tech.
Patent law’s strict liability regime operates under a quasi-constructive
notice system.  Ignorance of a patent does not excuse someone from
infringement, in large part because patents are public documents.  One
hopes that persons will actually review patents, both to learn from their dis-
closure and to assess whether they infringe them.140  This dynamic in part
justifies the strict liability regime that we have for direct infringement.  Poten-
tial inducers should also review patents to assess their potential liability.
Given the knowledge requirement for inducing infringement, one can only
be liable for inducement if she has actual knowledge of the patent or is will-
fully ignorant of it.
An important collateral consequence of the Supreme Court’s adoption
of the willful blindness standard in Global-Tech is that companies now have a
stronger incentive to search for and review patents.  Before Global-Tech, par-
ties could have avoided liability for inducing infringement by simply ignoring
patents altogether, burying their heads in the proverbial sand.  If a party did
not have actual knowledge of the particular patent at issue, then by definition
they could not be liable for inducing infringement.  If § 271(b) required
138 Glob.-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070 (2011).
139 Parts of this Section are based on the arguments I presented on behalf of myself and
fifteen other law professors in an amici brief filed in Commil. See generally Brief Amici
Curiae for Sixteen Intellectual Property Law Professors in Support of the Respondent,
Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896).
140 See Jason Rantanen, Patent Law’s Disclosure Requirement, 45 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 369, 370
(2013).  There are, of course, complications to this theory. See generally Janis & Holbrook,
supra note 81, at 86–89 (discussing the increasing complexity of the audience for patents
and patent law).
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actual knowledge of the patent, then someone could avoid inducement liabil-
ity by simply never looking for any relevant patents.
Global-Tech changed that dynamic because such ostrich-like behavior
now will not immunize the party.  The Court held that the knowledge
requirement for inducement of infringement under § 271(b) is satisfied if
the defendant “subjectively believe[s] that there is a high probability that a
fact exists,” i.e., that there is a patent, and the defendant “take[s] deliberate
actions to avoid learning of that fact.”141  The Court reasoned that the law
should not “protect[ ] parties who actively encourage others to violate patent
rights and who take deliberate steps to remain ignorant of those rights
despite a high probability that the rights exist and are being infringed.”142
By adopting the willful blindness doctrine, the Court created an incen-
tive for actors to look for patents and to ascertain whether their actions con-
stitute infringement.  Under Global-Tech, even if they don’t look for patents,
they can be found to have the requisite knowledge of the patent if they will-
fully blind themselves to the patent’s existence.  Moreover, by not reviewing
the patents, they will deny themselves the opportunity to develop a good faith
belief regarding infringement and invalidity.  After Global-Tech, there is now a
stronger incentive to search for and review patents: better to look and
develop a good faith belief than not to look and risk infringement liability
through the willful blindness doctrine.  Potential inducers “will not suffer a
negative inference if they ultimately decide not to rely on those opinions.”143
Justice Kennedy, a dissenter in Global-Tech, realized this dynamic in the Com-
mil oral argument, where he noted that “the whole point of Global-Tech was
inquiry was encouraged.”144
Commil, however, undermines this policy of inquiry and, as such, steps
back from the Court’s long-standing policy of challenging the validity of pat-
ents as articulated in Lear.
D. Critique of Commil and Its Implicit Rejection of That Policy Interest
The Supreme Court ultimately concluded that a good faith belief that
the relevant patent is invalid does not negate the mental state required to
induce infringement.  As such, the Court has undermined the appropriate
incentive it created in Global-Tech.  The incentive is no longer as strong
because a good faith belief in invalidity will not protect a potential inducer.
Moreover, on the margins, such inducers may opt not to enter the market at
all, creating anticompetitive consequences.  Ultimately, the Court’s decision
141 Glob.-Tech, 131 S. Ct. at 2070.
142 Id. at 2070 n.8; see also Kristin M. Hagen, Eyes Wide Shut: Induced Patent Infringement
and the Willful Blindness Standard, 17 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 305, 317 (2013).
143 Richard M. Marsh Jr., The Aftermath of Akamai: Induced Infringement and Opinions of
Counsel, 7 LANDSLIDE 29, 30 (2015) (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 298, which states that failing to
present “the advice of counsel with respect to any allegedly infringed patent . . . to the
court or jury[ ] may not be used to prove that the accused infringer . . . intended to induce
infringement of the patent”).
144 Transcript of Oral Argument, supra note 91, at 14.
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in Commil can be criticized on a number of bases, which this subsection
explores.
1. The Court’s Decision Reflects an Artificial Bifurcation of Invalidity and
Infringement
The Supreme Court, looking at the patent statute, treated invalidity and
infringement as completely distinct issues.  They are not, and the Court’s
holding reflects an artificial bifurcation of invalidity and infringement that
does not exist in practice.  A patent’s validity often depends on the construc-
tion afforded the relevant patent claim by the judge.  Broadly construed
claims are more likely to encounter validity issues.  When a court construes a
claim broadly, it is more likely to run afoul of the prior art, potentially being
invalidated as anticipated or obvious.145  Moreover, when a court construes a
claim broadly, there must be even more support in the patent’s disclosure to
support such breadth; otherwise the claim may be invalid for lack of an ade-
quate written description of the invention or sufficiently enabling
disclosure.146
The Federal Circuit itself has noted the “catch-22” when patentees argue
for a broad claim construction that ensnares the accused infringer’s device,
only to have the court invalidate the claim as a result.147  For example, the
court has noted the “irony of this situation,” where the patentee “successfully
pressed to have its claims include a jacketless system, but, having won that
battle, it then had to show that such a claim was fully enabled, a challenge it
could not meet.  The motto, ‘beware of what one asks for,’ might be applica-
ble here.”148  Relatedly, the Federal Circuit has also articulated a canon of
145 See 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (2012).  Congress recently amended the Patent Act to
change the definition of prior art for both anticipation and obviousness purposes.  The
America Invents Act moved the United States to a “first-to-file” system, which makes the
relevant date for assessing anticipation and obviousness, with some exceptions, the filing
date of the patent application.  Under the 1952 Patent Act, the relevant date for most
purposes was the date of invention. See Timothy R. Holbrook, Patent Anticipation and Obvi-
ousness as Possession, 65 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 7–8), http://pa
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2579715.
146 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (requiring a written description of the invention and a disclosure
that enables a person skilled in the art to make and use the claimed invention); see also
generally Timothy R. Holbrook, Patents, Presumptions, and Public Notice, 86 IND. L.J. 779,
802–03 (2011) (discussing the link between claim construction, claim scope, and disclo-
sure obligations).
147 See, e.g., Auto. Techs. Int’l, Inc. v. BMW of N.A., Inc., 501 F.3d 1274, 1285 (Fed. Cir.
2007); Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2007).  For an
argument that the Federal Circuit inappropriately prefers invalidity determinations over
non-infringement determinations, see Holbrook, supra note 146, at 803 (“[I]t would seem
more appropriate, if we do value patents, for the courts to err on the side of offering
narrower claim constructions that may result in noninfringement, but nevertheless pre-
serve validity.  The patentee should not be punished merely for advocating a legal position.
By adopting this catch-22 approach, the Federal Circuit has created an unwarranted bias
against patents.” (footnote omitted)).
148 Liebel-Flarsheim, 481 F.3d at 1380.
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claim construction—one that is admittedly rarely used149—that suggests a
court should construe a patent claim to retain its validity if reasonably
possible.150
The Supreme Court was aware of this dynamic but chose to ignore it.151
In so doing, the Court ignored the realities of patent litigation, instead
adopting a stilted statutory construction that artificially bifurcated infringe-
ment and invalidity and ignored the important lever that claim construction
plays in both circumstances.  Justice Scalia correctly recognized the Court’s
artificial bifurcation, observing in dissent that, while the majority “notes that
the Patent Act treats infringement and validity as distinct issues,” the distinc-
tion, while “true[,] . . . is also irrelevant.”152
2. The Supreme Court’s Decision Undermines Global-Tech and Reflects a
Retreat from Lear’s Policy of Encouraging Patent Challenges
More importantly, the Supreme Court’s rejection of the good faith belief
regarding validity to negate the intent requirement undermines the laudable
side-effect of Global-Tech.  By eliminating good faith defense with respect to
validity, review of a potential patent now may nevertheless result in liability,
reducing the incentive to review them to begin with.  From the perspective of
a potential inducer, there is no difference between a determination that
either the conduct is non-infringing or the patent is invalid: there will be no
liability for inducing the relevant allegedly infringing acts.  As Limelight made
clear, there must be a direct infringer for there to be induced infringement,
and there can be no direct infringer of an invalid patent.
The Court’s bifurcation of infringement and invalidity, therefore, belies
the real-world consequences of a determination of non-infringement or inva-
lidity.  In either scenario, there would be no liability for inducing infringe-
ment, which is all a potential market actor cares about.  From the ex ante
perspective, a party who has investigated a patent and thinks there will not be
infringement or that the patent is invalid would believe that their activities
would not trigger liability.  Permitting liability for inducing infringement in
the context of a good faith belief that the patent is invalid undermines the
benefits of Global-Tech.  A party that takes the initiative to proactively search
for patents and to determine in good faith whether its conduct will result in
liability now may be exposed to liability even if she believes the patent is
invalid, reducing the incentive to incur the cost to perform such a review at
all.
149 Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citing
Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v. ARM Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
150 Id. (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, 403 F.3d at 1368–69).  For an argument that this canon
should be given more robust application, see Timothy R. Holbrook, Possession in Patent
Law, 59 S.M.U. L. REV. 123, 157–59 (2006).
151 See supra note 91 and accompanying text.
152 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1931 (2015) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting).
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Not only does elimination of the good faith belief as a defense under-
mine the benefits of Global-Tech, it consequently also undermines the policy
articulated by this Court in favor of bringing challenges to likely invalid pat-
ents through litigation.  In Lear, the Court emphasized a “strong federal pol-
icy favoring free competition in ideas which do not merit patent
protection.”153  If a party believes a patent is invalid, then we should want
them to enter the market and, if sued, to challenge the patent they believe to
be invalid.
The Court has recognized that there is a need for incentives to challenge
potentially invalid patents.  Licensees are one group with an economic incen-
tive to challenge the patent’s validity, but would-be competitors could also
have sufficient incentive.  Encouraging the challenge of patents believed to
be invalid is important to clear markets of inappropriately issued patents.
Invalidation of a patent, in contrast to a non-infringement determination, is,
in many respects, a public good that may be undersupplied.  Securing an
invalidity judgment costs the accused infringer but benefits everyone in the
market.154  The patent becomes invalid as to the world, including the
accused infringer’s competitors who will not have borne the cost of the chal-
lenge.  Challenging patents that are believed to be invalid vindicates “the
important public interest in permitting full and free competition in the use
of ideas which are in reality a part of the public domain.”155  Because of the
risk of free riding—that those who did not incur the cost of challenging the
patent can now practice the invention if the patent is invalidated—validity
challenges may be undersupplied, requiring even more of an incentive to
bring such challenges.156
One can see the need for such an incentive in another context, that of
pharmaceutical litigation under the Hatch-Waxman Act.157  The statutory
structure of Hatch-Waxman is designed to encourage such challenges.
Hatch-Waxman created a complex regulatory regime designed to balance the
interests of pharmaceutical patent owners and generic manufacturers.  An
important design feature of this structure is the 180-day exclusivity period
that is provided to the first generic company to challenge a pharmaceutical
company’s patent.  The first generic company to successfully challenge the
patent—either by showing no infringement or patent invalidity or unenforce-
ability—receives 180 exclusive days where only the challenger and the patent
153 Lear, Inc. v. Adkins, 395 U.S. 653, 656 (1969) (citing Compco Corp. v. Day-Brite
Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964); Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225
(1964)).
154 See generally Joseph Scott Miller, Building a Better Bounty: Litigation-Stage Rewards for
Defeating Patents, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 667, 677–95 (2004) (discussing an accused
infringer’s incentives to challenge a patent’s validity versus accepting an attractive
settlement).
155 Lear, 395 U.S. at 670.
156 See Miller, supra note 154, at 688–95 (discussing undersupply of validity challenges).
157 See generally HON. KIMBERLY A. MOORE, TIMOTHY R. HOLBROOK & JOHN F. MURPHY,
PATENT LITIGATION AND STRATEGY (4th ed. 2013) (discussing structure and purpose of
Hatch-Waxman Act).
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holder will be on the market.158  The exclusivity period creates an incentive
for generic companies to challenge patents promptly, particularly on the
validity side.159  Such an incentive is also necessary: if a generic company
invalidates the patent, then other generic companies can quickly enter the
market (if they have FDA approval).  Why would a generic company incur
the substantial cost of patent litigation only to allow other competitors to
enter the market without incurring that expense?
The criticism often levied against the PTO is that it is too lax in policing
patent applications, allowing far too many patent claims to issue that do not
actually satisfy the patentability requirements.160  There appears to be a sig-
nificant number of invalid patents issued by the PTO, suggesting a need to
preserve the incentive to challenge patents in court.  Data show that many
litigated patents are in fact invalidated.  A recent study of all patent cases
filed in 2008–2009 showed that validity challenges were successful 42.4% of
the time.161  Such an invalidity rate is particularly striking given that patents
are presumed valid, requiring accused infringers to prove invalidity under
the heightened clear and convincing standard.162
Having invalid patents lurking around markets is not harmless.  Invalid
patents can have significant impacts on competition, even if they are not
enforced.163  The Federal Trade Commission has noted that “[p]oor patent
quality and legal standards and procedures that inadvertently may have
anticompetitive effects can cause unwarranted market power and can unjusti-
fiably increase costs.  Such effects can hamper competition that otherwise
would stimulate innovation.”164  As such, there are a considerable number of
invalid patents lurking in the marketplace, with potential harmful conse-
quences for competition. Lear and its progeny support a policy of incentiviz-
ing challenges to those patents.
Permitting liability even when a potential inducer has a good faith belief
in invalidity undermines this interest in challenging patents because it risks
chilling appropriate market entry and the potential attendant patent chal-
lenge.  With a defense based on a good faith belief that the patent is invalid,
the company can enter the market with a reduced sense of risk that their
behavior will trigger liability.  If they have such a good faith belief, then mar-
ket entry is desirable.  The potential exposure to liability, however, may deter
158 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(I) (2012).
159 See MOORE, HOLBROOK & MURPHY, supra note 157, at 467.
160 For an argument as to why such a permissive result is rational, see Mark A. Lemley,
Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495 (2001).
161 John R. Allison et al., Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L.
REV. 1769, 1787 fig. 4 (2014).
162 Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238, 2242 (2011).
163 See generally Christopher R. Leslie, The Anticompetitive Effects of Unenforced Invalid Pat-
ents, 91 MINN. L. REV. 101, 113–39 (2006) (discussing the relationship between patent law
and antitrust).
164 FED. TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF COMPETI-
TION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 5 (2003).
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such behavior even though, at the time, they believe their activity would not
trigger liability.
Of course, ultimately, that accused inducer’s belief must have been
wrong for this issue to arise in litigation—a court has found the patent
infringed and not invalid.  So, the infringer “may believe the patent [is] inva-
lid,” but, “[o]f necessity, litigated inducement decisions are all cases in which
those beliefs turn out to be wrong; there can be no inducement if there is no
direct infringement of a valid patent.”165
The Court recognized correctly that “it is often more difficult to deter-
mine whether a patent is valid than whether it has been infringed.”166  An
assessment of infringement involves considering the device made by the
potential infringer and comparing it to the claims in a potentially infringed
patent.  Generally, all of the information required for such an assessment is
within the possession of the potential inducer.  In contrast, a validity opinion
requires performance of a potentially costly prior art search and then a com-
parison of the prior art to the claims, a more costly and potentially more
complicated proposition.  Parties, therefore, rationally may want to obtain
only an infringement assessment and forego one for validity ex ante.167
But such concerns, contrary to the Supreme Court’s suggestion, do not
justify precluding the use of such a belief if a party has undergone such
expense and effort.  It also ignores the relationship that may exist among
claim construction, infringement, and invalidity.  A party evaluating the con-
struction of a patent may generate both non-infringement and invalidity
arguments depending on a broad or narrow construction.  Moreover, given
the public benefit that flows from an invalidity determination, one would
expect the Court to incentivize validity challenges, not create an incentive
against seeking validity opinion.  While the Court lauds this dynamic as sup-
porting its conclusion, it is actually a negative consequence of the Court’s
holding.
Nevertheless, from the ex ante perspective, if a good faith belief in the
patent’s invalidity would negate liability for induced infringement, parties
holding such a belief are more likely to enter the market.168  Such behavior
is pro-competitive and could bring questionable patents before the courts.169
Conversely, if a party can be liable for inducement even if they believe the
patent is invalid, they may decline to enter the market or engage in expensive
165 Lemley, supra note 30, at 243.
166 Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920, 1930 (2015) (quoting Cardi-
nal Chem. Co. v. Morton Int’l Inc., 508 U.S. 83, 99 (1993)).
167 My thanks to Jason Rantanen for bringing this argument to my attention and mak-
ing it more salient in my mind.
168 Holbrook, Intent Element, supra note 5, at 408 (“Truly culpable parties are those that
intend to induce infringement and not those who simply intend to induce the acts that
constitute infringement.  To hold otherwise would penalize a ‘good’ actor who holds a
belief that the others are not directly infringing.  Such behavior is pro-competitive—it
encourages parties to enter the market if they have such a belief.”).
169 Id. (“Allowing these parties to enter the market may create incentives to challenge
otherwise potentially invalid patents.”).
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design-around activity if they are risk averse.170  A conclusion that a party
may still be liable for inducing infringement if she holds a good faith belief
that the patent is invalid undermines the interest in encouraging patent
challenges.
The Supreme Court nevertheless ignored these potential consequences
and, as a result, has retreated from the policy of Lear and its progeny.  Such
retreat became crystal clear when the Court embraced the use of alternative
mechanisms to challenge arguably invalid patents, such as a declaratory judg-
ment action, inter partes review, ex parte reexamination, or the affirmative
defense of invalidity.171
This litany of alternative mechanisms of challenging the patent ignores
the initial threshold issue of whether a company should enter into an enter-
prise or not.  The Court now makes it incumbent on a potential competi-
tor—again one who believes the patent is invalid—to incur additional cost to
clear the patent away, as opposed to simply entering the market and forcing
the patent owners hand.  None of these options are specific to inducers,
either.  They apply to anyone potentially liable for infringement.
Moreover, the options may not be as readily viable as the Court makes
them out to be.  A competitor who has not yet entered the market would
have difficulty—if not face impossibility—in satisfying the conditions for a
declaratory judgment action.  There may not yet be a case or controversy that
would allow the potential inducer to get into court.  The party may choose
simply not to enter the market rather than enter and risk potential liability,
even if she believes the patent is invalid.
While a party could seek review through inter partes review or ex parte
reexamination, those processes are not cost-free.  They also may not elimi-
nate the patent or clarify all validity issues, particularly given the differences
used by the PTO in claim construction172 and the availability of claim
amendments during these procedures.173  Inter partes review and ex parte
170 See Michael J. Burstein, Rethinking Standing in Patent Challenges, 83 GEO. WASH. L.
REV. 498, 513–14 (2015) (“In some cases, a firm will find it not worth the risk to undertake
activity that requires investment that can then be held up in the face of adverse intellectual
property.  This is especially so because many startups and technology entrepreneurs are
rationally risk averse.”).
171 Commil, 135 S. Ct. at 1929.
172 The PTO affords claims their broadest reasonable interpretation, in contrast with
the approach used in litigation where the courts construe the claims in accordance with
the claims in the patent, the patent specification, the record during the patent’s prosecu-
tion at the PTO, and any relevant evidence extrinsic to the public record. See generally
Dawn-Marie Bey & Christopher A. Cotropia, The Unreasonableness of the Patent Office’s
“Broadest Reasonable Interpretation” Standard, 37 AIPLA Q. J. 285 (2009).
173 35 U.S.C. § 305 (2012) (ex parte reexamination); id. § 316(d) (inter partes review);
id. § 326(d) (post grant review).  Critics have noted the PTO’s unwillingness so far to allow
amendments in inter partes review proceedings, though one such motion has finally been
successful. See John R. Schroeder, PTAB Finally Grants a Motion to Amend in Inter Partes
Review, SENNIGER POWERS (June 3, 2014), http://www.senniger.com/article-details.aspx?ar
ticle=3667&articlegroup=#sthash.OC4xNVkj.dpuf.
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reexamination are also limited to validity challenges based on printed publi-
cations and patents.174  While competitors are more likely to have these types
of prior art, given their public nature, a competitor who would like to chal-
lenge the patent on the basis of a public use, on-sale activity,175 or inade-
quate disclosure cannot do so.  A party can challenge a patent on any basis in
post-grant review proceedings (PGR) and in the interim covered business
method program (CBM).176  Post-grant review challenges can only be
brought within nine months of the patent’s issuance, creating significant
time constraints on a potential challenger.177  As for CBM challenges, they
are limited only to patents on methods of doing business, limiting their use-
fulness to broader types of inventions.178  A CBM proceeding also can only
be instituted once a party has been accused of, or sued for, infringement.179
Thus, these various procedures are not the panacea that the Supreme Court
painted them to be.  If the challenge is unsuccessful, a potential inducer may
yet have to face a validity challenge in court.
As for raising a defense in litigation, the accused infringer of course
must have raised the issue but was unsuccessful.  If it was successful, we
wouldn’t be addressing the issue of a good faith belief in invalidity.  Regard-
less, all of this ignores the ex ante incentives that a potential competitor with
174 35 U.S.C. §§ 301(a)(1); id. § 302 (noting that reexamination is limited to prior art
of § 301, which lists only printed publications and patents); id. § 311(b) (noting that inter
partes review is only available “on the basis of prior art consisting of patents or printed
publications.”).
175 The 1952 Patent Act precluded a patent if the invention was on sale or in public use
more than a year before the filing date of the relevant patent application. Id. § 102(b).
The America Invents Act, which changed the United States from a first-to-invent system to
a first-inventor-to-file system, also precludes a patent if the invention was in public use or
on sale. Id. § 102(a).
176 Id. § 321(b) (noting that a PGR can be brought on any ground “under paragraph
(2) or (3) of section 282(b) (relating to invalidity of the patent or any claim)”); America
Invents Act, Pub. L. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 284, 329 (2011) (noting that CBM “shall
employ the standards and procedures of[ ] a post-grant review”).
177 35 U.S.C. § 321(c).  These proceedings can also only be used to challenge patents
prosecuted under the AIA, although this is a temporary concern. See id. § 2(f)(2)(A) (not-
ing that the provision applies “only to patents described in section 3(n)(1),” the provision
defining the new first-inventor-to-file regime).
178 Section 18(a)(1)(E) of the AIA notes that “[t]he Director may institute a transi-
tional proceeding only for a patent that is a covered business method patent.”  AIA
§ 18(a)(1)(E).  Section 18(d)(1) defines “covered business method patent” as “a patent
that claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or other
operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial product or
service, except that the term does not include patents for technological inventions.” Id.
§ 18(d)(1).  The Federal Circuit has allowed challenges on appeal to whether a patent is
properly considered a covered business method patent. See Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP
Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1319–20 (Fed. Cir. 2015).
179 AIA § 18(a)(1)(B) (“A person may not file a petition for a transitional proceeding
with respect to a covered business method patent unless the person or the person’s real
party in interest or privy has been sued for infringement of the patent or has been charged
with infringement under that patent.”).
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knowledge of the patent faces.  One would hope a competitor who doubts a
patent’s validity would err on entering the market.  Instead, the Supreme
Court chills such behavior, or at least makes it more costly by making it
incumbent on the competitor to affirmatively challenge the patent, before
the patent holder potentially has expressed any interest in enforcing the pat-
ent at all.
In sum, the Supreme Court’s decision in Commil represents a retreat
from the policy interest advanced in Lear and its progeny to encourage pat-
ent validity challenges.  The Court suggested few parties may have the eco-
nomic incentive to bring such challenges, which makes sense given that
invalidity determinations act as a public good and thus may be undersup-
plied.  The Court in Commil, however, undermines the incentive that poten-
tial competitors—inducers—will have to bring such challenges.  These
parties may enter the market if they believe that they do not infringe the
patent.  If their belief is limited to invalidity, however, such parties may
choose not to enter the market or may otherwise design around the patent,
incurring potentially wasteful costs in so doing.  From this perspective, Com-
mil is step in the wrong direction.
III. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS AND MISSED OPPORTUNITIES
The Court’s step away from Lear in its Commil decision is significant, but
equally important are the questions left unanswered by the Court that will
need to be addressed by the district courts and eventually the Federal Circuit.
First, a patent may be valid yet unenforceable for some reason, such as when
the applicant commits inequitable conduct at the PTO or when the patent
owner has misused the patent.  The Court’s bifurcation of infringement and
invalidity therefore is underinclusive as to the range of potential outcomes of
patent litigation.
Second, and more importantly, the Supreme Court failed to explain the
temporal aspect of the inducement mental state.  In particular, the Court
implicitly retains the rule that a good faith belief that the induced acts are not
infringing should serve as a defense.  Nevertheless, the issue of a good faith
belief that the induced acts do not infringe creates timing issues.  Once the
accused inducer has been proven wrong—that the acts are infringing—then
there is no reason to immunize the inducer from prospective relief.  The
Supreme Court failed to recognize this temporal dynamic, as has the Federal
Circuit.  The Federal Circuit should adopt a rule that such a good faith belief
only acts to immunize the inducer from past damages and not from prospec-
tive relief, such as an injunction or ongoing damages.  This Section unpacks
these oversights by the Supreme Court and offers potential answers to them.
A. What About a Good Faith Belief in Unenforceability?
The decision in Commil is specific to a good faith belief in the patent’s
invalidity, and it implicitly confirms that such a belief of non-infringement
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will negate the required intent.  There are other reasons, however, that a
potential inducer may believe that it will not be liable for infringement.
For example, a patent may be rendered unenforceable under a number
of equitable doctrines.  If the patent applicant violated her duty of candor at
the PTO, then the patent may be unenforceable under the doctrine of ineq-
uitable conduct.180  If the patentee unduly delays the issuance of the patent,
then it may be unenforceable under the doctrine of prosecution laches.181
After patent issuance, a patent may be unenforceable if the owner has
attempted to leverage the patent in anticompetitive ways under the doctrine
of patent misuse.182  Patents may also be unenforceable as a result of other
equitable defenses, such as laches or equitable estoppel.183  The question
remains as to whether a good faith belief in any of these or other defenses
should negate the required mental state for active inducement.
Although this is technically an open question, the courts likely will
answer it in the negative readily, if and when the issue is presented.  The
180 See Therasense, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson and Co., 649 F.3d 1276, 1310–1311 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (en banc).  To be clear, inequitable conduct may not be a frequent basis for an
ex ante belief regarding enforceability of the patent.  Assessing inequitable conduct prior
to litigation may be difficult because the determination rests on the mental state of the
patent applicant—did the applicant have the “specific intent to deceive the PTO.” See id.
at 1290.  Such an assessment would be difficult, if not impossible, prior to litigation
because a party likely would need to depose the applicant and her attorneys. See Jason
Rantanen & Lee Petherbridge, Toward a System of Invention Registration: The Leahy-Smith
America Invents Act, 110 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 24, 25 (2011) (“As uncovering
most forms of inequitable conduct requires a searching analysis of the candor of the appli-
cant’s behavior during a secret ex parte process, it seems improbable that patent challeng-
ers will learn of the relevant conduct before discovery.”).
181 See, e.g., Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson Med., Ed. & Research Found., LP, 422
F.3d 1378, 1384–86 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
182 See Princo Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 616 F.3d 1318, 1328 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en
banc).
183 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag SCA Pers. Care, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Prods.,
LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc); A.C. Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides
Const. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en banc).  In SCA Hygiene, in a 6-5 vote,
the en banc Federal Circuit retained laches as a defense to past damages in light of Petrella
v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1962 (2014), but altered its impact on prospective
relief:
We conclude that Congress codified a laches defense in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1)
that may bar legal remedies . . . .
Nevertheless, we must adjust the laches defense in one respect to harmonize
it with Petrella and other Supreme Court precedent. We emphasize that equitable
principles apply whenever an accused infringer seeks to use laches to bar ongoing
relief.  Specifically, as to injunctions, considerations of laches fit naturally within
the eBay framework.  In contrast, Menendez v. Holt, 128 U.S. 514 (1888), and
Petrella counsel that laches will only foreclose an ongoing royalty in extraordinary
circumstances.
SCA Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1315.  In contrast to inequitable conduct, laches and equitable
estoppel involve assessments of actions by the patentee that are well within the grasp of the
accused inducer.  As such, ex ante assessments of these defenses are far more likely.
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reasoning the Court used to distinguish invalidity and infringement applies
with even greater force in the context of these other defenses.  While unen-
forceability is listed as a defense in the same statutory provision as non-
infringement, unenforceability is still listed separately from non-infringe-
ment within that provision.184  Moreover, these defenses are not linked
together the way infringement and invalidity are through claim construction.
Most of these defenses rest on acts by the patentee and not based on the
content of the patent itself.185
As such, the answer to this open question seems clear: a good faith belief
in these other defenses will not negate the scienter requirement for active
inducement.  Only a good faith belief in non-infringement will be available as
a defense to active inducement of infringement.
B. A Good Faith Belief of Non-Infringement Should Only Immunize a Party from
Past Damages and Not from Prospective Relief
Because a good faith belief in non-infringement remains a viable way to
negate the scienter requirement, then another issue also arises: What is the
impact of that negation?  The only reason the issue of the inducer’s good
faith belief would arise in litigation is because the inducer was wrong—at trial
she was unable to prove that the induced acts were non-infringing.  If she
were correct, then there would simply be no liability for lack of a direct
infringer.186  The unanswered question then is the extent to which the good
faith belief in non-infringement should serve as a defense.
Consideration of the purposes of active inducement lead to the conclu-
sion that a good faith belief of non-infringement should act as a defense only
to past damages.  Once a court has rejected the accused inducer’s non-
infringement arguments, there is no longer a possibility that the inducer has
a good faith basis for believing that the patent is not infringed.187  Unless the
infringer alters her conduct after a final determination of infringement, any
ongoing behavior necessarily will be infringing.  Because the accused
infringer’s belief regarding infringement has now been disabused, the
inducer should be liable for any ongoing conduct.  The belief should not act
as an absolute defense to all relief, past and future.
Consequently, the inducer should be subject to a permanent injunction,
if warranted,188 or liable for future damages, such as ongoing royalties.189
184 See 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) (2012) (noting as defenses “[n]oninfringement, absence
of liability for infringement or unenforceability.”).  Invalidity defenses are listed in
§§ 282(b)(2) and (3).
185 See Margo A. Bagley, The New Invention Creation Activity Boundary in Patent Law, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 577, 580 (2009).
186 Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akamai Techs., Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2111, 2117 (2014) (hold-
ing that, for inducement, there must be a direct infringer).
187 The Court would also have to find the patent not invalid for liability.
188 The Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s near per se rule of granting permanent
injunctions if a party is found to infringe a valid patent.  eBay Inc. v. MercExchange,
L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 393–94 (2006).  If a party is not entitled to the four-factor test articu-
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Once the patent is found not invalid and infringed, the belief of the inducer
no longer matters.  Any future infringing conduct should be stopped
through injunctive relief or should be subject to an ongoing royalty.
While this temporal aspect seems clear, the courts have yet to hold
expressly that a good faith belief in non-infringement is only a defense to
past damages.  This question remains an open one.  In one recent non-prece-
dential decision, Bose Corp. v. SDI Technologies, Inc., the Federal Circuit
explored the temporal aspect of such a good faith belief but did not specifi-
cally hold that it failed to negate injunctive relief or ongoing damages.190  In
Bose, the appellant argued that the district court erred because its grant of
summary judgment inappropriately “insulated SDI from potential post-ver-
dict liability.”191  The Federal Circuit agreed, noting that “[a] jury could, at
trial, find the patent not invalid and infringed.”192  As a result, the court
noted that “SDI’s opinion of counsel would not shield it from post-verdict liability
because SDI could not credibly argue that it maintained its good faith belief
of invalidity following a verdict to the contrary.  The summary judgment
improperly absolved SDI of potential post-verdict liability.”193  The court
remanded, however, because “[a] material dispute thus remain[ed] on the
issue of whether SDI relied in good faith on its opinion of counsel.”194
Bose, of course, is no longer good law in light of Commil’s rejection of the
good faith belief regarding the patent’s validity.  Also, it is non-precedential,
and the discussion of post-verdict liability is technically dicta.  As a result,
although courts have alluded to this temporal aspect of induced infringe-
ment, no court has expressly held that inducers should be subject to prospec-
tive relief, regardless of their pre-suit good faith belief in non-infringement.
Under the proposal offered here, the good faith belief in invalidity or
non-infringement would function similarly to the way the defense of laches
operated in patent law until recently.  Laches is used as a defense when the
accused infringer has been materially prejudiced by the patentee’s unreason-
able delay in bringing suit.195  Under Federal Circuit law, laches primarily
lated for a permanent injunction, it may still subject to paying an ongoing royalty. See, e.g.,
Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., 504 F.3d 1293, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“Under some
circumstances, awarding an ongoing royalty for patent infringement in lieu of an injunc-
tion may be appropriate.”).
189 See Holbrook, Intent Element, supra note 5, at 405–07; see also Rantanen, supra note
38, at 1603 n.162 (“[W]ith respect to future infringement, arguably neither contributory
infringement nor inducement requires the demonstration of fault . . . . In short, when
litigating over future infringement, it should not be necessary to establish fault with respect
to whether or not the third party conduct infringes.”).
190 Bose Corp. v. SDI Techs., Inc., 558 Fed. App’x 1012 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
191 Id. at 1023.
192 Id.
193 Id. (emphasis added).
194 Id. at 1024.
195 SCA Hygiene Prods. Aktiebolag SCA Pers. Care, Inc. v. First Quality Baby Products,
LLC, 807 F.3d 1311, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (en banc) (“We conclude that Congress codi-
fied a laches defense in 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(1) that may bar legal remedies.”); A.C.
\\jciprod01\productn\N\NDL\91-3\NDL303.txt unknown Seq: 37 30-MAR-16 9:11
2016] revolution  in  induced  patent  infringement 1043
acts as a defense to past damages.196  The good faith belief would operate
similarly here, negating only past damages and not prospective relief.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Commil failed to address this temporal
dynamic, leaving the question open as to an accused inducer’s good faith
belief of non-infringement.  The Court failed to appreciate how exposure to
prospective relief helps mitigate some potential negative aspects of permit-
ting good faith belief (be it non-infringement or the patent’s invalidity)
could create laudable effects beyond those addressed above.
Opponents of the good faith belief defense—be it invalidity or non-
infringement—have expressed the concern that parties could easily obtain
“rubber stamp” opinion letters.  A party will simply hire an attorney who will
opine, post-Commil, that there is no infringement, allowing the party to
escape liability for inducement.197  One commentator has compared these
opinion letters to consumer warning labels placed on products, which are
viewed purely as a formality.198
These concerns are considerably mitigated, however, if a potential
inducer is still exposed to prospective relief.199  Exposure to prospective
relief would cabin an attorney’s discretion in providing her opinion.
The possibility of a permanent injunction would act as a check on the attor-
ney being overly optimistic about the likelihood of defeating an infringe-
ment suit.  The client is relying on the opinion to plan its business
operations and would want an honest assessment of the risk that they may
have to shut operations down or alter them to avoid infringement.200
Aukerman Co. v. R.L. Chaides Constr. Co., 960 F.2d 1020, 1028–29 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (en
banc) (“[L]aches may be defined as the neglect or delay in bringing suit to remedy an
alleged wrong, which taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances, causes
prejudice to the adverse party and operates as an equitable bar.”).
196 Aukerman, 960 F.2d at 1028 (“Where the defense of laches is established, the paten-
tee’s claim for damages prior to suit may be barred.”).  The Federal Circuit maintained
laches as a defense to past damages in SCA Hygiene but rejected Aukerman’s suggestion that
laches played no role with respect to ongoing relief. SCA Hygiene, 807 F.3d at 1332
(“Laches, an equitable defense, belongs in [the eBay] calculus.  We, accordingly, reject
Aukerman’s bright line rule regarding the interplay between laches and injunctive relief.”).
The court did conclude, however, that “absent egregious circumstances, when injunctive
relief is inappropriate, the patentee remains entitled to an ongoing royalty.” Id.
197 See, e.g., Brief for Intellectual Property Owners Ass’n as Amici Curiae Supporting
Petitioner at 2, Commil USA, LLC v. Cisco Sys., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1920 (2015) (No. 13-896)
(“The end result is that virtually all potential infringers can easily absolve themselves of
liability for inducing infringement of a valid patent for the price of an opinion letter from
counsel.”).
198 See Rader, supra note 30, at 332.
199 Minimally, this concern rests entirely on the assumption that attorneys would risk
committing professional misconduct by rubber-stamping a letter that provides a legally
inaccurate opinion.  It is illogical to assume that an attorney would knowingly jeopardize
her standing in the profession over an opinion letter.
200 Holbrook, Intent Element, supra note 5, at 410–11.
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That their clients may be exposed to future liability and injunctive relief
should act as a check on any intuition that they should simply issue “rubber
stamp” opinion letters.
Determining when the accused infringer has lost, and thus when dam-
ages begin to accrue, may create some uncertainty in litigation.  But courts
routinely deal with such grey areas.  Complexities of litigation and damages
calculations should not drive substantive patent law decisions.  Lawyers
should be able to sort out whatever point in time past damages end and
future relief begins.  Indeed, such complexities could arise in any case where
injunctive relief comes into play.  The Federal Circuit’s general approach to
laches belies the argument that such an approach is unworkable.  Courts are
well-equipped to make the appropriate determinations that take into consid-
eration the rights of a patent holder on a case-by-case basis.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s reworking of active inducement of infringement
has been significant, yet overlooked.  The Court, contrary to many of its
other holdings, has generally been favorable to patent holders in the way it
has interpreted § 271(b), allowing liability in the absence of actual knowl-
edge of the particular patent at issue and limiting “good faith” defenses solely
to a good faith belief that the induced acts do not infringe.  Nevertheless,
these changes mark a stark departure from Lear’s stated interest in generat-
ing challenges to patents.  The Court, perhaps inadvertently, has retreated
from this position, depending on a litany of pragmatic arguments that ulti-
mately are unpersuasive.
The Supreme Court and Federal Circuit have also missed the important
temporal dynamic that surrounds the good faith belief defense (now only of
non-infringement): that belief only becomes relevant if the accused inducer
was wrong.  As such, from that point forward, no such belief can be in good
faith, and it should not continue to shield the inducer from liability.  A good
faith belief in non-infringement should only act as a defense to past damages.
An inducer should otherwise be subject to injunctive relief or, if appropriate,
ongoing damages.
